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Stress-induced changes in human decision-making
are reversible
JM Soares1,2,3,5, A Sampaio1,4,5, LM Ferreira1,2,3, NC Santos1,2,3, F Marques1,2,3, JA Palha1,2,3, JJ Cerqueira1,2,3 and N Sousa1,2,3
Appropriate decision-making relies on the ability to shift between different behavioral strategies according to the context in
which decisions are made. A cohort of subjects exposed to prolonged stress, and respective gender- and age-matched controls,
performed an instrumental behavioral task to assess their decision-making strategies. The stressed cohort was reevaluated after
a 6-week stress-free period. The behavioral analysis was complemented by a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study to detect the patterns of activation in corticostriatal networks ruling goal-directed and habitual actions. Using structural
MRI, the volumes of the main cortical and subcortical regions implicated in instrumental behavior were determined. Here we
show that chronic stress biases decision-making strategies in humans toward habits, as choices of stressed subjects become
insensitive to changes in outcome value. Using functional imaging techniques, we demonstrate that prolonged exposure to stress in
humans causes an imbalanced activation of the networks that govern decision processes, shifting activation from the associative to
the sensorimotor circuits. These functional changes are paralleled by atrophy of the medial prefrontal cortex and the caudate, and
by an increase in the volume of the putamina. Importantly, a longitudinal assessment of the stressed individuals showed that both
the structural and functional changes triggered by stress are reversible and that decisions become again goal-directed.
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Introduction
The ability to mount an appropriate response to stress is vital
for the survival of every living organism. However, when the
homeostatic mechanisms to cope with stressful stimuli are
disrupted, either because the individual has a particular vulne-
rability or because the response system is exhausted by a
continuous activation, maladaptive responses take place and
predispose to cognitive impairment and even to pathological
conditions.1–3 Maladaptive stress affects cognitive behavior
through sequential structural modulation of brain networks,
mainly as a consequence of the release of corticosteroids.4,5
In fact, several studies have revealed stress-induced deficits
in spatial reference- and working-memory and behavioral
flexibility;6,7 these behavioral changes are attributed to
synaptic/dendritic reorganization in both the hippocampus6
and the medial prefrontal cortex.7,8 Recently, we showed, in
rodents, that chronic stress triggers changes in the frontos-
triatal networks that govern instrumental behavior decisions.9
Briefly, different corticostriatal circuits are thought to control
competing behavioral strategies during choice situations:
whereas the medial prefrontal cortex and the caudate nuclei
(associative striatum) have been implicated in goal-directed
actions, the putamen (sensorimotor striatum) has been
implicated in habitual behavior.10,11 In that study, we showed
that chronic stressed rats display an atrophy of the associative
network (medial prefrontal cortex and dorsomedial striatum),
in parallel with a hypertrophy of the dorsolateral (sensorimotor)
striatum and the most lateral portions of the orbitofrontal
cortex. In addition, the structural changes were associated
with a bias in decision-making strategies, as behaviors in
stressed rats rapidly shifted from goal-directed actions to
habits.9
This automatization of recurring decision processes into
stereotypic behaviors or habits caused by exposure to stress
can be viewed as ‘advantageous’, as it increases behavioral
efficiency by releasing cognitive resources for more demand-
ing tasks.10 Typically, habitual responses do not require the
evaluation of their consequences and can be elicited by
particular situations or stimuli.10,11 However, to adapt to
ever-changing life conditions, the ability to select the
appropriate actions to obtain specific outcomes based on
their consequences is of utmost importance. The capacity
to shift between habit-based and goal-directed actions is a
condition for appropriate decision-making.12 Importantly,
this flexibility includes the ability to inhibit automatisms
(habits) in order to use the more demanding goal-directed
strategies, which was shown to be impaired in stressed
rodents.9
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Materials and methods
Subjects, psychological tests and cortisol measure-
ments. Two cohorts of medical students participated in
this experiment: one was under their normal academic
activities (controls, n¼ 12; 6 females, 6 males; mean age,
23.6±2.11), whereas the other included subjects that had
just finished their long period of preparation for the medical
residence selection exam (chronic psychosocial stress;
stress group, n¼ 12, 6 females, 6 males; mean age, 23.9±
0.70). For the longitudinal assessment, stressed individuals
(n¼ 12) were reassessed in similar conditions 6–7 weeks
after the end of the exposure to stress. To control for the
influence of test–re-test, a smaller cohort of stress-recovered
individuals (n¼ 4; 2 females, 2 males; mean age, 24.25±
0.96) naı¨ve to the first experiment were also included. In
addition, we also reassessed a smaller cohort of control
subjects (n¼ 4; 2 females, 2 males; mean age, 24.33±1.15)
6 weeks after the first assessment. After arrival, the subjects
responded to a laterality test and to a self-administered
questionnaire regarding stress assessment (perceived stress
questionnaire).13 The perceived stress questionnaire is a
reliable and validated instrument to assess chronic psycho-
social stress in both healthy and clinical adult samples.5,13,14
It measures four scales (worries, tension, joy, demands); the
first three scales represent internal stress reactions, whereas
the scale ‘demands’ relates to perceived external stressors.
Participants were further assessed with the Hamilton anxiety
scale15 and the Hamilton depression scale16 by a certified
psychologist. The Hamilton scales provide a broad asse-
ssment and are widely used, including healthy populations;17
here, the clinical cut-scores for anxiety and depression were
not used, but rather a continuous approach to the variables to
compare absolute scores was utilized. Upon filling of the
questionnaires, and immediately before the instrumental
task, subjects collected saliva samples using Salivette
(Sarstedt, Germany) collection devices. Collection took
place between 0900 h and 0500 h in all subjects (the varia-
tion in cortisol levels in this time period is relatively small;18
furthermore, subjects from the control and the stressed group
were mixed in order to have a similar distribution of the
collection time for cortisol, allowing to minimize the impact of
the variation in collection time). Samples were stored at
20 1C until the biologically active, free fraction of the stress
hormone cortisol was analyzed using an immunoassay
(IBL, Hamburg, Germany). Subjects were preassessed to
exclude those with a previous history of neurological or psy-
chiatric illness; none indicated a history of eating disorders.
The study was conducted in accordance with the principles
expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved
by the Ethics Committee of Hospital de S. Marcos (Braga,
Portugal). The study goals and tests were explained to all
participants and all gave informed written consent.
Instrumental task. The task was adapted from a validated
protocol.19 Subjects were asked to fast for at least 12 h
before their scheduled arrival time at the laboratory, but were
permitted to drink water. Before starting the instrumental
task, hunger level and pleasantness of the liquid foods were
checked for each subject. The liquid-food rewards were
chocolate milk and tomato juice. Alternatively, apple or straw-
berry juices were given to subjects that did not find pleasant
either chocolate or tomato juice. These liquid foods were
selected as they can be administered in liquid form, are
palatable at room temperature, and their flavor and texture
are distinguishable; in this way, sensory-specific satiety effects
were kept and the likelihood of the subjects developing a
generalized satiety to all liquid foods was minimized. The
food rewards were delivered by means of separate syringe
pumps (one for each liquid) positioned in the scanner room;
subjects received the food through polyethylene plastic tubes
(straw-like) although they lay supine in the scanner. The task,
with an event-related jittered design, consisted of different
sessions: sessions of valued (VAL) actions with reward
deliver followed by sessions of devalued (DEV) actions with
the outcome devaluation and extinction. Between the two
sessions there was a 30-min break, during which subjects
were fed to satiety with one of the two liquid foods, outside of
the scanner. Each session consisted of 150 trials (50 trials
per condition: chocolate, tomato and neutral) subdivided in
five blocks of 30 trials each. In each trial, the decision time
was 1.5 s; after each decision, the choice appeared high-
lighted during 4 s; this was followed by the reward delivery
time, a black screen with a red fixation with 2 s duration, and
the jittered interstimulus interval with 4 s mean duration
(Supplementary Figure 1). Before the experiment, subjects
were informed about the pairs of fractal patterns that would
appear on each trial and were instructed to select one of the
possible actions on each trial. They were informed that
according to their choices they would receive 0.75 ml of liquid
food (valued outcome), the same quantity of a neutral solution
(water) or nothing; although there was no information about
which action was associated with which particular outcome,
subjects were told that one of each pair of actions was
associated with a higher probability of obtaining an outcome
than the other. During the first session, subjects were instru-
cted to learn to choose the actions that led to high
probabilities of pleasant liquid foods, including chocolate
and tomato juice. Choosing this option led to a chance of
obtaining chocolate milk (P¼ 0.4) or orange juice (P¼ 0.3) in
the chocolate condition, and tomato juice (P¼ 0.4) or orange
juice (P¼ 0.3) in the tomato condition. After this session, in
which subjects learned to preferentially choose the options
that gave them the best chance of obtaining a juice reward,
they were then removed from the scanner and invited to eat
to satiety (selective satiation), until they did not want to eat
any more, and the pleasantness rating for that food had
decreased (devaluation), as checked by a reassessment
similar to the one used before session 1. This selective
outcome devaluation procedure served to devalue one of the
outcomes associated with a particular instrumental action,
leaving the value of the outcome associated with the other
action intact. To test the effects of the devaluation procedure,
subjects underwent a second session, in which they were
presented with the same trial types involving the same
actions and once again had to select whichever action they
preferred. The chosen stimulus increased in brightness as it
did during the first session but, in this session, the outcome
was no longer presented (that is, the subjects were tested
in extinction for these outcomes). That is, the devalued and
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non-devalued outcomes were never presented again to the
subjects during the test. Yet, to maintain responses on both
the actions subjects still received the non-devalued orange
juice outcome so that the overall outcome was now available
with equal probability on the two available actions (P¼ 0.3
each). The total acquisition time was between 2.5–3 h. Using
this design and by comparing the different patterns of
activation between the first (first 30 trials) and the last
block (last 30 trials), one can appreciate the different
brain areas associated with distinct behaviors during the
instrumental task.
Data acquisition. The different MRI acquisition sequences
of the brain were conducted in different sessions on the same
day, using a clinically approved Siemens Magnetom Avanto
1.5. T (Erlangen, Germany). The detailed description of data
acquisition is provided in Supplementary Materials and methods.
Image processing. The detailed description of fMRI and
volumetric data analysis20–24 is provided in Supplementary
Materials and methods.
Statistical analysis. Results of the psychological scales,
cortisol levels, behavioral performance and regional volumes
were analyzed in the IBM SPSS Statistics software, v.19.
(IBM, New York, USA). The detailed description of the
statistical analysis is provided in Supplementary Materials/
subjects and Methods.
Results
Stress insensitivity to outcome devaluation is rever-
sible. In order to investigate whether our previous findings in
rodents translate into humans, we designed two experiments.
In the first, two cohorts of medical students were recruited:
one was under their normal academic activities (controls,
n¼ 12), whereas the other included subjects that had just
finished their long period of preparation for the medical
residence selection exam (stress group, n¼ 12). Stressed
individuals displayed increased scores in the stress-per-
ceived questionnaire (Figure 1a; t22¼ 3.429, P¼ 0.002) and
in the Hamilton anxiety (t22¼ 2.202, P¼ 0.042) and depression
scores (t22¼ 3.698, P¼ 0.001) when compared with controls;
a trend was also found for increased salivary cortisol levels in
stressed subjects (t22¼ 2.077, P¼ 0.05). In the second
experiment, we performed a longitudinal study in the same
stressed individuals (stress recovered, n¼ 12) by reass-
essing their psychological and behavioral performance 6–7
Figure 1 Exposure to chronic stress does not influence the acquisition of instrumental tasks and activates the associative fronto-striatal network. (a) Mean score of the
stress perceived questionnaire (control vs stress t22¼ 3.429, P¼ 0.002; stress vs stress recovered t11¼ 3.663, P¼ 0.004). (b) Response rate during the acquisition of the
task, for the valued rewards ((b1) chocolate, (b2) tomato) in both the high (chocolate: control t11¼ 2.568, P¼ 0.026; stress t11¼ 3.806, P¼ 0.003; stress recovered
t11¼ 2.615, P¼ 0.024; tomato: control t11¼ 3.144, P¼ 0.009; stress t11¼ 2.556, P¼ 0.027; stress recovered t11¼ 2.828, P¼ 0.016) and the low probability options
(chocolate: control t11¼ 1.321, P¼ 0.213; stress t11¼ 2.152, P¼ 0.054; stress recovered t11¼ 3.120, P¼ 0.010; tomato: control t11¼ 2.677, P¼ 0.022; stress t11¼ 2.335,
P¼ 0.039; stress recovered t11¼ 2.187, P¼ 0.051). No significant differences were found between groups. (c1), Pattern of activation when deciding between high- vs low-
value choices during the learning phase of the task (that is, contrast between the last and first block of the first session). The activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (left
medial superior gyrus; x¼10, y¼ 44, z¼ 32; Z score¼ 2.81; Po0.002, uncorrected) demonstrates the engagement of this brain region during the acquisition of the
decision task. No other brain region showed effects at this significance in this contrast. (c2), Pattern of brain activation in controls throughout the learning phase of the task.
There is activation of components of the associative network, namely the medial prefrontal cortex (anterior cingulate: x¼ 0, y¼ 10, z¼ 42; Z score¼ 4.13; Po0.05,
corrected for small volume for family wise error (FWE)) and the caudate nucleus (left: x¼12, y¼ 6, z¼ 10; Z score¼ 4.49; Po0.05, corrected for small volume for FWE
and right x¼ 18, y¼ 10, z¼ 18; Z score¼ 3.67; Po0.05, corrected for small volume for FWE).
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weeks after the end of the exposure to stress, which allowed
to infer on the (ir)reversibility of the stress-induced changes.
The results clearly showed that a stress-free period of a few
weeks is sufficient to normalize all the psychological changes
(Figure 1a; stress perception: t11¼ 3.663, P¼ 0.004; anxiety
score: t11¼ 2.766, P¼ 0.018; depression score: t11¼ 4.551,
P¼ 0.001); salivary cortisol levels were partially restored
(t11¼ 1.835, P¼ 0.094). To control for the influence of test–
re-test, a smaller cohort of stress-recovered individuals
(n¼ 4) naı¨ve to the first experiment were also included; no
differences were obtained in any parameter under study
between stress-recovered non-naı¨ve and naı¨ve groups (data
not shown). In addition, a smaller cohort of control subjects
(n¼ 4) was also reassessed 6 weeks after the first assess-
ment; no significant differences were found between the two
assessment moments in any of the parameters analyzed
(data not shown).
Following the psychological and analytical determinations,
we tested whether chronic stress affected the ability of the
individuals from all groups to perform actions based on the
consequences of their behavior, using an operant instru-
mental task adapted from Valentin et al.19 All subjects were
under 12 h fasting. After receiving instructions on the task,
subjects learned how to associate an action to an outcome
(valued: chocolate and tomato juice; neutral: water). All
groups increased their choices of options with a high proba-
bility of reward (chocolate and tomato juice) (tomato: control
t11¼ 3.144, P¼ 0.009; stress t11¼ 2.556, P¼ 0.027; stress
recovered t11¼ 2.828, P¼ 0.016; chocolate: control t11¼ 2.568,
P¼ 0.026; stress t11¼ 3.806, P¼ 0.003; stress recovered
t11¼ 2.615, P¼ 0.024) in detriment of low-probability options,
indicating that both control and stressed subjects had no
difficulty in associating the particular action they were
performing with the specific outcome obtained (Figure 1b).
Of note, there was no preference for high or low probability
options when the reward was neutral (all comparisons
nonsignificant, data not shown). This operant task was
performed with the subject inside a scanner, during the
acquisition of fMRI, which allowed determining the patterns of
activity of fronto-striatal networks during the decision-making
processes.25 The response rate during the acquisition phase
(Figure 1b) was observed to be similar and goal-directed in all
experimental groups. Although distinction between high- and
low-value outcomes triggers a specific activation of the medial
frontal gyrus (Figure 1c1), a region of the brain associated with
high-level executive function and decision-making,26 the
learning of the instrumental task in goal-directed actions
activated highly the cingulate gyrus and the caudate nuclei
(Figure 1c2), both key components of the associative network.
In a second session, we tested whether subjects were
sensitive to outcome devaluation, by providing free access to
one of the rewards (for example, chocolate), until they referred
satiety before starting the task. In accordance with our
rodent studies, controls adapted their choices in response to
sensory-specific satiety, whereas stressed subjects were
insensitive to the expected value of the outcome, as indicated
by the lack of a devaluation effect (Figure 2a; control:
t11¼ 3.767, P¼ 0.003; stress: t11¼ 1.464, P¼ 0.171); impor-
tantly, group comparisons proved that the stress group
significantly differs from controls in the number of devalued
choices (Figure 2a; t22¼2.143, P¼ 0.043), but not in valued
options (t22¼ 0.410, P¼ 0.686). These data suggest that
individuals without stress exposure perform actions because
of the consequences of their behavior, whereas stressed
subjects rapidly develop habitual behaviors and do not adjust
their actions to their current needs. Importantly, during the
devaluation phase of the task stressed subjects activate
significantly more the left putamen than controls (Figure 2b2),
whereas controls display a greater activation of the right
caudate than stress subjects (Figure 2b1); these findings
correlate with an impairment in devaluation observed in
stressed subjects and support the view that habit-based
decisions are linked to an overactivation of components of the
sensorimotor corticostriatal network. Interestingly, after a period
of recovery from stress, these subjects regain the ability to
orient their action by goal-directed decisions (Figure 2a;
Figure 2 The stress insensitivity to outcome devaluation is reversible and associated with variations of the activation of the corticostriatal networks. (a) Response rate for
the high probability option of the devalued reward before (last block of the first scanning session) and after (first block of the second scanning session) devaluation. Controls
significantly reduced their preference (control: t11¼ 3.767, P¼ 0.003), whereas stressed subjects were insensitive to the decrease in the value of the outcome (stress:
t11¼ 1.464, P¼ 0.171), but regained a goal-directed behavior after a stress-free period (stress recovered: t11¼ 3.336, P¼ 0.007). Group comparisons showed that the stress
group significantly differs in the number of devalued choices from both controls (t22¼2.143, P¼ 0.043) and stress-recovered subjects (t11¼ 2.918, P¼ 0.014). (b) Pattern
of activation during devaluation phase of the task. Controls display a higher activation in the right caudate nuclei (x¼ 8, y¼ 6, z¼ 12; Z score¼ 3.45; Po0.05 corrected for
small volume for FWE) than stressed subjects (b1), whereas stressed subjects display a greater activation of the left putamen (x¼26, y¼ 0, z¼ 16; Z score¼ 3.35;
Po0.05 corrected for small volume for FWE) than controls (b2); after a period of recovery from stress, a higher activation of the right caudate (x¼ 20, y¼4, z¼ 22;
Z¼ 3.39; Po0.005, uncorrected) is observed when compared with activation immediately after stress (b3). *Po0.05; line: within group comparisons; dashed line: between
groups comparisons.
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stress recovered: t11¼ 3.336, P¼ 0.007; stress vs stress
recovered: valued t11¼ 0.338, P¼ 0.742 devalued t11¼
2.918, P¼ 0.014) and display a greater activation of the right
caudate during devaluation than subjects immediately after
stress exposure (Figure 2b), in a pattern of activation very
similar to the one found in controls.
Structural plasticity in the stressed brain. The impair-
ment in decision-making and shift in behavioral strategies
observed in stressed individuals evoke the effects observed
after manipulations of the associative or sensorimotor
corticostriatal circuits.9,27,28 Therefore, using neuroimaging
morphological techniques, we first investigated the effects of
chronic exposure to stress on the structure of striatal and
cortical circuits known to be required for goal-directed actions
and habits; in addition, we also assessed the recovery from
stress in the same parameters. The present data reveals
opposing effects of chronic stress in the caudate and in the
putamen: whereas we found an atrophy of the caudate
(relative volumes) that was only significant on the right
(Figure 3a; left: t22¼ 2.067, P¼ 0.051; right: t22¼ 2.676,
P¼ 0.014), the putamen revealed a significantly increased
relative volume in both hemispheres (Figure 3a; left:
t22¼ 2.617, P¼ 0.016; right: t22¼ 3.132, P¼ 0.005). As a
consequence, the caudate-to-putamen ratio was increased
in controls relative to stressed individuals (left: 0.72 vs 0.61,
t22¼ 3.565, P¼ 0.002; right: 0.76 vs 0.64, t22¼ 4.190,
Po0.001, respectively), which suggests a bidirectional
modulation of neuronal connectivity in the dorsal striatum
expressed by a global hypertrophy of the sensorimotor
striatum, and a shrinkage of the associative striatum. In
addition, the orbitofrontal cortex, which is also a target of
stress5,9 and has been implicated in decision-making,29,30
showed a different pattern of change, with the most medial
portions of the orbitofrontal cortex displaying a structural
atrophy that reached statistical significance in the left
hemisphere (Figure 3a; left: t22¼ 3.764, P¼ 0.001; right:
t22¼ 1.494, P¼ 0.149), whereas nonsignificant increases
were found in the lateral components of this cortical region
(left: t22¼ 30.319, P¼ 0.075; right: t22¼ 1.355, P¼ 0.189).
No differences were found in the motor or somatosensory
cortices (Figure 3a; motor: left: t22¼ 1.450, P¼ 0.161; right:
t22¼ 0.459, P¼ 0.651; sensory: left: t22¼ 1.272, P¼ 0.217;
right: t22¼ 0.543, P¼ 0.593) or in total intracranial volumes
(t22¼ 0.033, P¼ 0.974). Noticeably, most structural changes
found in stressed subjects were transient. Indeed, data from
the second neuroimagiological assessment revealed a
complete recovery of the caudate (Figure 3b; left: t11¼
2.590, P¼ 0.025; right: t11¼ 2.494, P¼ 0.030), right putamen
(Figure 3b; t11¼ 2.246, P¼ 0.046) and left medial portions of
the orbitofrontal cortex volumes (Figure 3b; t11¼ 2.914,
P¼ 0.014) and a trend for restoration in the volume of the
left putamen (Figure 3b; t11¼ 1.495, P¼ 0.163). Importantly,
these results demonstrate that stress-induced changes are
not permanent and after a short period of recovery from
stress (6 weeks) young adults display an impressive plas-
ticity in fronto-striatal networks.
Discussion
The burden of chronic stress exposure is increasing in our
modern society. Although stress response is vital for the
survival of every living organism, maladaptive responses to
stress can produce changes in the brain and affect cognitive
processes, attention and executive functions,1–3 such as
decision-making. The selection of the appropriate actions in
particular situations is an extremely dynamic process. Actions
can be selected based on their consequences (for example,
when we first select the best route to drive from home to work).
This goal-directed behavior is crucial to face the ever-
changing environment but demands an effortful control and
monitoring of the response. To increase the efficiency, one
can automatize recurring decision processes as habits (or
rules). Habitual responses no longer need the evaluation of
their consequences and can be elicited by particular situations
or stimuli (for example, after driving to work for some time in
the established route, we automatically, when entering the
car, go that way). The ability to shift back and forth between
these two types of strategies is necessary for appropriate
decision-making in everyday life. For example, in a novel
situation, it may be crucial to be able to inhibit a habit and use a
Figure 3 Volumetric changes in the brain after stress exposure (a) and after recovery from stress (b). Upper panels represent changes in subcortical regions, whereas the
lower panels represent volumetric variations in cortical regions. (a) The impact of stress in the structure of corticostriatal loop. The color changes illustrate variations in volumes
of stressed subjects in contrast to controls. (b) The amount of recovery from the impact of stress in the structure of cortico-basal ganglia loop. The color changes illustrate
variations in volumes in stressed subjects after recovery from stress.
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goal-directed strategy (for example, if we need to go to
another place first, besides work, it is most likely inappropriate
to use our habitual route to work).
In this study, we show that humans exposed to chronic
stress rapidly shift toward habitual strategies (in other words,
following the above example, stressed individuals are more
likely to choose the habitual route, even when the right choice
would be to go a different way). More specifically, our findings
demonstrate that prolonged exposure to stress triggers a
reorganization of corticostriatal circuits that determine deci-
sions under instrumental tasks (instrumental behavior is
determined by the association between an action and an
outcome, as tested in this study; in this form of responses,
actions can be either ‘goal-directed’ or ‘habitual’. By testing
the subjects from the two distinct conditions—control vs
stressed—in a paradigm in which they work for a reward, the
pattern of their instrumental responses can be discriminated).
An atrophy of the associative corticostriatal circuit that rules
goal-directed actions, in parallel with a hypertrophy of the
sensorimotor corticostrial network, was found in young
subjects displaying signs and symptoms of stress; these
structural changes were associated with a decreased activa-
tion of this circuit in instrumental tasks. Most importantly,
stressed individuals had a bias to habits in their decision-
making processes. Interestingly, we also demonstrate the
remarkable plasticity of these neuronal circuits, by showing
that after a stress-free period, both the structural and the
functional changes were reverted and the pattern of decision
in previously stressed subjects was again biased, which
became again goal-directed. Of note, other studies, in distinct
experimental conditions, have shown volumetric variations in
a similar (or even shorter) time frame.31,32 In the stress field,
studies have also demonstrated rapid structural changes
triggered by stress exposure.6,33 These changes typically
occur at the dendritic level and are likely to represent
alterations in synaptic connectivity between different brain
regions. Alterations in several molecules, including trophic
factors and adhesion molecules, are assumed to underlie
such structural changes, which occur in opposite directions in
distinct brain regions. Importantly, these changes are asso-
ciated with functional impairments at specific neural circuit
level.
Our results confirm a divergent structural reorganization of
corticostriatal circuits in humans exposed to prolonged stress,
with hypertrophy/overactivation of the sensorimotor and
atrophy/deactivation of the associative corticostriatal circuits.
This frontostriatal reorganization is accompanied by a shift
toward habitual strategies, affecting the ability of stressed
individuals to perform actions based on their consequences.
These results expand previous studies showing that acute
stress can modulate decision-making processes in humans.34
For the first time it is now demonstrated that such behavioral
changes are linked to alterations in the frontostriatal networks
in humans, thus providing insights into the neural circuits
underlying the shift between goal-directed actions and habi-
tual behavior, and that can lead to dysfunctional decision-
making upon exposure to stress.
Noticeable, this stress-decision bias was found to be
reversible after the end of the stress exposure, with signs of
plasticity both at the structural and at the activational levels.
This is in accordance with previous data in rodents and
primates showing that stress-induced changes in the struc-
ture of the prefrontal cortex are reversible, at least in young
subjects.7 As a consequence of the structural/activational
reorganization, we found a behavioral restoration of decision-
making strategies in subjects that have been exposed to
stress. This novel finding is of paramount importance
inasmuch as optimization of decision-making processes
confers an important advantage in response to a constantly
changing environment. Indeed, under conditions of maladap-
tative stress, there is a reduced ability to shift from habitual
strategies to goal-directed behaviors, even when conditions
would recommend that shift. However, it is also true that the
fronto-striatal networks, even after prolonged stress, preserve
the plastic properties that allow for a functional recovery once
the stressful stimuli are gone. Therefore, these results are not
only of relevance to understand the mechanisms through
which stress is modulating decision-making in both physiolo-
gical and pathological conditions, but they certainly also pave
the way for interventional therapies that empower stress-
coping mechanisms.
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